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ABSTRACT 
The member states have self-interested objectives and they use 
their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize 
their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament 
(EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality 
between member states. Given the current decision procedures of 
the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure 
covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure 
consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to 
assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into 
member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model. 
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acknowledged. 1 Introduction
Recent research indicates that the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers
(CM) explains past EU budget allocations largely, but not completely.1 More speci¯cally,
this public choice or power politics approach argues that EU budget allocations among
member states derive from to the distribution of voting power in the CM, which is the
key decision-maker on the EU budget.2 This argument is further strengthened by the fact
that the major part of the EU expenditure is devoted to speci¯c policies with a strong
redistributive bent, i.e., the common agricultural policy (CAP) and structural operations.
This gives CM members strong incentives to a®ect their receipts from the budget, while
the true needs deriving from low income regions and poor agricultural conditions obtain
only a minor role.
This paper asks whether deviations from the voting power prediction of the EU budget
allocation might be attributed to the in°uence of the European Parliament (EP). We make
use of the fact that EP has e®ective budgetary power on non-compulsory (i.e., structural
spending, internal and external policies and administration) but not on compulsory (i.e.,
to the most part, agricultural) expenditures.3 Our hypothesis is that the budgetary deci-
sions of the EP, unlike those of CM, have benevolent, redistributive objectives. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we ¯nd that while the allocation of the non-compulsory expendi-
tures re°ects voting power shares, it is partly determined by member states' income levels.
By contrast, for the compulsory expenditures the prediction based on the power politics
explanation is not improved by such measures.
The current stage of power politics approach4 can be criticized due to lack of insti-
tutional details in the models of EU's budgetary procedures. Although CM is usually
considered as the main stakeholder in the budgetary decision making, EP obtained a
role in budgetary decision-making already in the 1970s and has gained importance ever
1See Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004, 2007) and references therein
2For recent applications that evaluate the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers,
see Widgr¶ en (1994), Laruelle and Widgr¶ en (1998), Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2003), Leech (2002),
Baldwin and Widgr¶ en (2004a, 2004b) and references therein.
3The Lisbon Treaty removes this distinction and presumably strengthens Parliament's in°uence.
4See Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004, 2007) for a survey of power politics and needs approaches with
regard to the EU budget.since due to decreasing share of CAP in the EU budget. In fact, the budget procedure
was the ¯rst area of EU decision-making where EP obtained e®ective in°uence. More-
over, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) enjoy a unique position, as they are
likely to gain credit for expenditures agreed by the EP, but at the same time, they do
not have to incur the related costs. Enderlein and Lindner (2006) give the EU budget
an expenditure-led description that combines EP's incentives to suggest new expenditure
programmes and CM members' incentives to reduce their contributions. Earlier, in par-
ticular, the quantitative literature has mostly disregarded the role of EP in budgetary
decision-making and despite numerous descriptive analyses of EP's role and incentives in
budgetary procedures previous studies lack in a quanti¯cation of EP's impact on budget
allocation.5
In this paper, our aim is to bring in the qualitative descriptions of the EP's role in
budgetary procedures to a power politics driven model and quantify its impact. Hence, we
assess the determination of receipts from EU budget by considering a richer institutional
structure than in earlier studies. We rely on earlier evidence suggesting that, in their
voting behavior, MEPs follow partisan rather than national views (see Roland and Noury
(2002)). This evidence together with qualitative descriptions of EP's work suggest that
MEPs promote benevolent aspects in their decisions on the EU budget.
The purpose of this paper is not to propose alternative rules, which is certainly an
interesting question even on the bases of evidence from historical data. In the literature
there are some theoretical examples that propose changes for the existing rules. For
example, Feld et al. (2002) support budget referenda for the EU. They ¯nd that it would
not imply dramatic changes in spending but, nevertheless, it would prevent the extreme
deviations from median voter's, i.e. citizens' preferences. Feld et al. (2002) are, however,
investigating the total spending (without the distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory spending) and, moreover, not the allocation of spending between the member
states, which is the purpose of this paper. Naturally it would be interesting to combine
5Note that EP's role in the legislative procedures of the EU has been analysed and quanti¯ed using
game theoretic approaches (e.g. Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006), Steunenberg et al. (1999) and Tsebelis
(1994).
2the analysis of reforms and allocation questions but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our empirical identi¯cation scheme makes use of the fact that the EU budget divides
into two portions, non-compulsory and compulsory expenditures. It turns out that EP has
e®ective in°uence on the former, but not on the latter. This point follows from an analysis
of actual decision-making procedures that are applied in the two types of expenditures. In
a nutshell, CM has the last word on the determination of the compulsory expenditures,
while EP has the last word on the determination of the non-compulsory expenditures.
Given this, if MEPs have benevolent objectives, we expect that at least a part of the non-
compulsory expenditures re°ect member states' true needs. On the other hand, member
states' shares on the compulsory expenditures should merely attribute to their voting
power in CM.
We test our hypotheses by regressing EU states' shares of the non-compulsory and
compulsory expenditures on measures for voting power and needs of the member states.
We apply the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) as the main measure for voting power in CM.
The SSI treats the budget allocation problem as a dividing-up-the-cake problem and tells
what are the expected shares of individual voters when each uses his voting power to allo-
cate as much resources for himself as possible. Previous research indicates that SSI does
not necessarily re°ect the true power distribution among member states. In particular,
there is evidence that strong cooperative patterns between France and Germany should
be incorporated into the standard power politics prediction deriving from SSI alone. In
line with this, we consider augmented budget share regressions with corrective terms on
the part of France and Germany. As a measure for needs, we apply the member states'
income per capita relative to the EU wide average income per capita.
Our results are clear. Consistent with our primary hypothesis, we ¯nd that while the
allocation of the non-compulsory expenditures re°ects voting power shares, it is partly de-
termined by member states' income levels. By contrast, for the compulsory expenditures
the prediction based on the power politics explanation is not improved by such measures.
Our results have interesting implications. On the one hand, they indicate that EP in-
deed can promote benevolent objectives in determining a part of the budget allocations.
Looking this from another perspective, EP's in°uence prevents CM from implementing
3a complete power politics based sharing of the EU cake. On the other hand, the results
indicate that CM indeed prevents EP from achieving its benevolent objectives in a variety
of decisions. Thus, the results of the paper point out, once again, that for understanding
the workings of the EU decision-making one must understand the workings of the forces
of political power among member states.
We compare our predictions with those from previous EU budget analyses. In contrast
to earlier studies, we ¯nd that, indeed, benevolent objectives have a role in determining
the budget allocation. However, we also ¯nd that the impact is relatively small, only
about 7 percent of the total spending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the current budgetary
procedure and explains why the power distribution between CM and EP is di®erent for
non-compulsory and compulsory expenditures. Section 3 lays out the foundation of our
empirical budget share models deriving in part from political power and in part from
the needs of the member states. Section 4 reports our empirical results, while Section 5
concludes with discussion on topics for future research.
2 The Budgetary Procedure
The point of departure of our analysis is that EU budget shares are primarily determined
by the distribution of political power among member states in the CM, and not as much
by their needs for support to rural and low-income regions. However, since EP exerts
power in the budgetary procedure as well, the determination of member states' receipts
contains a benevolent element. Since EP has, in practise, its say in the determination of
non-compulsory expenditure that is closely linked to structural spending we assume that
it cares about member states income levels. Compulsory expenditure accounts approxi-
mately 45 per cent of the EU budget.6 It is based on EU legislation and, therefore, it is
plausible to assume that the distribution of power in CM determines compulsory budget
receipts.7
6This is approximately equal to the percentage of agricultural spending total expenditure.
7Note that EP has powers in the codecision procedure. It is, however, only seemingly an equal













































Figure 2: The Budget Procedure of the EU
6Figures 1 and 2 show the budget procedures for compulsory and non-compulsory ex-
penditure respectively. In both cases, the European Commission (EC) proposes a prelim-
inary draft budget (PDB) which is then adopted or amended by CM in its ¯rst reading.
Thereafter, if EP accepts the draft budget as adopted or amended by CM the draft budget
is adopted. If, on the other hand, EP proposes amendments to the draft the procedure
continues. At this phase, the procedure concerning compulsory expenditure and the pro-
cedure concerning non-compulsory expenditure deviate from each other. In the former,
EP needs a simple majority to propose amendments. Abstentions have no e®ect in the
EP since the majority is counted on the basis of MEPs that are present. In the latter pro-
cedure, however, abstentions are e®ectively like 'nay' votes since the amendments require
support from a majority of MEPs.
In compulsory expenditure, proposed amendments can be divided into increasing mod-
i¯cations that try to increase the expenditure that directly results from Treaty application
or acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty and into non-increasing modi¯cations expen-
diture that try to reallocate between applications or acts adopted in the Treaty. In both
cases, CM can adopt the proposed amendments by quali¯ed majority voting (QMV)8 or
reject them. In the case of non-increasing modi¯cations, CM must explicitly reject or
change the proposed amendments to avoid adoption as amended by EP but in the case of
increasing modi¯cations it su±ces for CM to not to decide. Thus, in this case adoption
as amended by EP requires an active acceptance by CM using QMV.
In non-compulsory expenditure, EP makes the last move. After EP has proposed
amendments CM can in its second reading adopt them by QMV or make modi¯cations
by QMV as well. In the former case, the expenditure is adopted as amended by EP.
In the latter case, EP can adopt CM's modi¯cations by making no decision or it can
reject or change the modi¯cations by 3=5 majority and then the expenditure is adopted
theoretic reasoning Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006) show that, indeed, CM takes the lion's share of in°uence
in codecision procedure. Moreover, compulsory expenditure is mainly used for CAP that is based on
decisions made using consultation procedure in which EP has no power. For a non-cooperative game
theoretic modelling of the consultation procedure actors' in°uence in it see e.g. Steunenberg (1994) or
Napel and Widgr¶ en (2008).
8Presently 255 votes of the total number of votes 345.
7as amended by EP.9
By comparing these two procedures it is easy to see that in compulsory expenditure
EP's in°uence is very limited. In non-compulsory expenditure, EP is in much more pow-
erful position since it can say the last word in the procedure. It is worth noting, however,
that to obtain a majority of MEPs support to propose amendments might be much more
di±cult than to obtain a majority of present MEPs. Moreover, the modi¯cations of EP
are limited by the maximum rate of increase in expenditure.
We assume that the member states use their in°uence in the CM to allocate as much
money to their home country as possible. As the description of the procedures demon-
strates this works at best in compulsory expenditure. In determination of non-compulsory
budget receipts we assume that they can be explained by power politics in CM and benev-
olent goals of EP. Since non-compulsory expenditure is closely related to cohesion, struc-
tural spending, external and internal policies and administration we assume that EP cares
about the relative income levels of member states (for details see subsection 3.4 below).
3 Elements in Predicting the Allocation of the EU
Budget Expenditure
In the earlier literature, the allocation of member states' net and gross budget receipts
from the EU budget have been evaluated using either game theoretic power politics rea-
soning (e.g., Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2007 or Baldwin et al. 2001) or simply mechanical cal-
culations that mirror the EU's budget structure to country characteristics (e.g., relative
importance of agriculture and income level) that supposedly have in°uence on countries'
contributions and receipts. In the latter approach, a more advanced attempts to de¯ne
plausible measures for member states' needs in the main headings of EU expenditure are
used to explain member states' receipts.
9Note that 2=3 majority of MEPs can reject the overall budget, which restarts the procedure. In this
paper we disregard this since in terms of power relations the restarted procedure is essentially similar
game.
83.1 Earlier Empirical Evidence
The existing power politics literature on EU budget can be divided into two generations.
The ¯rst generation models concentrated on explaining member states net receipts (pay-
ments) from (to) EU budget. The main inspiration of these models was a simple statistical
observation that power and net budget °ows coincide. The second generation models con-
centrate on gross receipts and stem from cooperative bargaining/voting games. In these
models it is assumed that member states' contributions are highly institutionalised and
can be treated as taxes. Consequently, member states can in°uence their net positions
via annual budgetary procedures concerning the expenditures and EU decision-making in
general that turn into member states' gross receipts.
Baldwin et al. (1997) made, to our knowledge, the ¯rst attempt to use the political
power view to explain EU budget allocations empirically. Using observations for 1993
and 1994, they regressed per capita receipts on a constant, per capita voting power, and
a dummy variable for poor member countries. They used the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI)
to proxy member states' voting power.10 They found that the SSI explains member states
gross receipts and that member states contributions to the budget can be explained as
a ¯xed share of GDP. Subsequently, Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001) carried out similar
regressions for the periods 1992-94 and 1995-99, separately. In the latter papers also the
normalized Banzhaf index (NBI) of cooperative games were used as a measure of voting
power.11 Based on OLS regression analyses these studies concluded that per capita net
budget receipts can be explained pretty well by measures of political power, while variables
like the agriculture share of GDP and GDP per capita fail to be statistically signi¯cant
or GDP per capita even got a wrong sign in some model versions.
Kandogan (2000) studied the correlation between actual budget shares and SSI and
distinguished between the two most important expenditure headings, the CAP and struc-
tural spending. His empirical analysis were conducted for years 1976-85. He regressed
the ratio of the budget shares in CAP expenditures to the voting power for each country
10For a formal de¯nition of the measure see subsection 3.2 below for details.
11For the SSI, see below, Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1954). For the NBI, see Penrose
(1946) and Banzhaf (1965).
9against a constant, deviation of that country's adjusted percent of population in agricul-
ture from the EU-average and the logarithm of the voting power (SSI). He argued that
this regression can explain why some countries are receiving more agricultural funds than
implied by their voting power alone. He run a similar regression for the structural funds
and obtained the same conclusion as on the CAP shares. In a way Kandogan's (2000)
analyses indicate that the budget shares cannot be explained by power politics alone.
Nevertheless, it is di±cult to see from his analysis what part of the budget shares can be
explained by power politics and what determines the rest of the shares. Also, a major
part of the variation in the budget shares remains unexplained in these regressions.
Some recent studies attempt to combine the power politics and needs views in explain-
ing the receipts. A common result in these hybrid models is that power politics has a
dominant role in explaining the receipts (e.g. Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2004, Baldwin et al.
2001). In the existing studies that apply power politics or hybrid models, the distribution
of voting power in CM represents the power politics view. Needs are usually taken into
account by some quantitative measures that mimic the overall structure of the budget, like
output in agriculture and income levels. Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004) make the ¯rst at-
tempt to explore the relative importance of the two hypotheses. For this purpose, Kauppi
and Widgr¶ en propose simple relative measures for the needs of the member states and
then combine these with the SSI to estimate weights for the two views of the EU budget
allocation. In their baseline model, political power explains about 60% of the member
states' budget receipts and the remaining 40% derive from member states' needs.12 This
result is obtained using annual observations for 1976-2001, a larger data set than in any
previous empirical paper on EU budget. The novel feature of the study is to examine
whether the power politics explanation can be improved by taking possible cooperation
patterns between EU countries into account. Kauppi and Widgr¶ en ¯nd that even 95% of
the budget shares can be explained by voting power measures that allow for correlated
preferences and cooperative voting patterns between the member states. Interestingly, the
12The predictive power of the pure SSI improves to 70 percent if the UK rebate is taken into account.
A modi¯ed version of the SSI that draws on Stra±n (1977, 1988) improves the predictive power of pure
power based explanation to 90 percent (see Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2004 for details).
10paper identi¯es stable cooperation patterns between France and Germany. Altogether,
Kauppi and Widgr¶ en conclude that sel¯sh power politics is likely to drive EU's decision
making in general and the allocation of EU budget in particular, while needs play at most
a minor role. In a more recent paper, Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2007) argue that budget
shares can be explained solely by political power if Franco-German cooperation is taken
into account.
Besides the benevolent aspects power politics approach for modeling budget shares can
also be challenged by one more point. The critical question is whether the SSI measure
gives accurate enough description of the actual power distribution of the member states.
The SSI assumes that the voters' preferences (probabilities of voting yes) are correlated
in the same way regardless of the group of actors. However, in reality some countries may
have more similar interests together than with others in many issues. Hence, they may
¯nd it bene¯cial to cooperate on a wide range of issues more closely. If such cooperative
groupings of EU member states are formed continuously, the standard SSI may yield an
imprecise measure of true power distribution among the member states.13
3.2 Self-interested Governments and Power Politics in CM
In the formal power politics analysis, the budget allocation problem is treated as the
dividing-up-the-cake problem. This is one of the most investigated problems in game
and bargaining theory. The literature is very wide ranging from cooperative to non-
cooperative game theory with several applications. In recent years, these methods have
been applied to study di®erent aspects CM decision-making or decision-making procedures
of the EU. Here we adopt the cooperative approach and assume that game theoretic power
politics approach applies only for the CM. That is a plausible assumption since CM is
13In Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004),we considered modi¯ed SSI values under the assumption that the
EU is divided into two opposite groups of member states. We computed corresponding modi¯ed SSI
measures for all possible bi-partitions of the EU countries. Interestingly we found that such modi¯ed
power measures provide signi¯cantly better match with the past EU budget shares than the pure SSI
provided that France and Germany are on the same side. In practice, close cooperation between France
and Germany was a necessary and founding condition for the development of European integration after
WWII. Later, it has been a point of departure in several steps towards deeper integration, like the EMU,
and Internal Market but also in the development of the EU budget. Franco-German cooperation is
also highly institutionalised and accepted by other member states (see Blankart and Kirchner 2004 and
Schoutheete (1990).
11an inter-governmental body that represents directly member states' governments. The
redistributive nature of the EU budget further supports the applicability of the power
politics assumption.
A widely applied measure to evaluate actors' voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index
(SSI) (Shapley and Shubik 1954). It can be seen as a special case of a broader concept the
Shapley value (Shapley 1953) in cooperative coalitional form games. SSI is restricted to so-
called simple games that are usually used to model voting games. In simple voting games,
winning and losing coalitions have di®erent values (usually one and zero respectively). The
SSI is based on the broad idea that an actor that can break a winning coalition into losing,
or vice versa, exerts power. These actors are critical in the sense that they may help a
coalition to achieve its goals but also prevent a coalition from achieving them. In voting
games, in particular, these actors are said to be in a swing position as they are capable
to swing a majority into minority and vice-versa by changing their vote. Suppose that
a swing position is rewarded by a price, which ends up as money in the data. Then the
percentage of an actor's swing positions of all swing positions predicts his/her expected
in°uence on voting outcome and hence his/her share of the cake in cake-division or his/her
share of receipts in the allocation of budget expenditure. Despite of their abstractness
there is some recent evidence that power indices are able to capture actors' in°uence on
the outcome in voting games and predict decision outcomes in a meaningful way (e.g.
Pajala and Widgr¶ en 2004, Thompson et al. 2006 or Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2007).
More formally, let N be a set of n member states in the Council and let S ½ N denote
any coalition of member states having s members. A voting game in the Council can
be characterized by a set function v(S) taking on value 1 when a coalition S forms a
quali¯ed majority and zero otherwise. In this simple setting, the Shapley-Shubik index
Ái of a member state i can be written 14
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It can be interpreted as player i0s probability of having a swing in a vulnerable coalition, i.e. in a coalition
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where i = 1;:::;n indicates a member state i. The ¯rst term in the sum gives the
probability of country i being in a pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term
counts those pivotal positions where country i is able to swing a winning coalition into
losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal of i from it makes it losing.15 The individual
actors' SSI values sum up to unity.16 Thus, SSI implies that the relative shares of the
players' swing positions predict their shares of the total pay-o®. In our application, the
total pay-o® constitutes the EU's compulsory budget spending. We, thus, expect the
member states' shares of compulsory expenditure to have one-to-one correspondence to
SSI. 17
3.3 Franco-German cooperation
As noted above standard power indices disregard di®erent cooperation patterns among
the member states in CM. Earlier studies on the distribution of power in CM provide
some investigations on the impact of cooperation between member states having similar
preferences in several policy areas (see e.g. Widgr¶ en 1994, 1995) or di®erentiated pref-
erences that are based on some country-characteristics (e.g. Kirman and Widgr¶ en 1995,
Hosli 2002).18
The most prominent example of a deep collaboration between the EU member states
is formed on the basis of Franco-German dialogue. It was ¯rst a necessary condition for
up to unity. Therefore to assess relative power or the distribution of power the PBM is often normalized
and then referred to as the (normalised) Banzhaf index (NBI).
15One characterization of the SSI refers to actors' permutations that are equally likely. This is not,
however, a generic property of the index.
16The SSI obeys four axioms. The dummy axiom states that a player without any contribution (swings)
to any coalition is powerless. The e±ciency axiom states that the cake is fully allocated and there is no
surplus left. The symmetry axiom states that the names of the players do not a®ect the allocation but
only their voting rights and, ¯nally the transfer axiom gives the way to combine games. Another classical
power index, the Banzhaf index, obeys all these except the e±ciency axiom (see Dubey and Shapley 1979
and for an alternative characterization Laruelle and Valenciano 2001).
17Here it is important to see that the EU budget (the cake) can be taken as ¯xed when decisions on its
allocation are made in the Council. For a careful explanation see Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004, p. 230).
18Note that the literature that applies spatial voting in the EU often uses di®erentiated preferences
(e.g. Passarelli and Barr 2007).
13European integration but later the cooperation between France and Germany has become
a highly recognised, predictable and institutionalised since the Elys¶ ee Treaty (1963) sub-
system within the EU.19 Other potential sub-systems that have often been mentioned are
the Benelux and the Nordic cooperation. They are both institutionalised and they have
collaborated intensively in areas that has gone beyond the EU integration. The Benelux
countries started to pursue common external trade policy in 1950 and liberalised their
capital and labour movements in 1954 and 1956 respectively. The Nordic countries have
formed a common labour market since 1954 and a passport union since 1958 (agreed in
1954).
In this paper we consider the impact of Franco-German cooperation on the EU bud-
get allocation. We disregard the Benelux and Nordic cooperation since the EU budget
policies do not belong to those where the countries most likely show their cooperation on
permanent basis. Franco-German axis di®ers in that respect since the early development
of the EU budget was in°uence of tacit collusion of France and Germany having oppo-
site preferences, the former advocating agricultural support to protect rural regions from
more intensi¯ed competition and the latter having its interests mainly on well-functioning
Internal Market that would bene¯t German manufacturing industries. On the other hand
France's and Germany's joint participation in European integration was essential. There-
fore, France's and Germany's emerging cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s had an easy
task to extend the domain of European to wide range of policies having a direct impact on
the development of European integration. For the purposes of this paper an interesting
question is whether Franco-German cooperation has an in°uential role also in the EU's
budget policies and, if it has, is it similar in compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure.
19Sub-systems are bilateral or wider coalitions within the EU that are durable, intensive and more
organised than coalitions that form in the quest for particular short-term interests. Moreover, formation
of these coalitions are predictable in decision-making. See Schoutheete (1990) for the de¯nition of sub-
systems in the EU more in detail. He argues that there are no other bilateral sub-systems in the EU than
Franco-German axis.
143.4 Benevolent MEPs and the Impact of EP
As noted in previous section, the major impact of EP on budget allocation comes through
the decision-making in non-compulsory expenditure. In compulsory expenditure, that is
mainly channeled to CAP, CM is the main actor although EP is not completely neglected.
Since national interests play the key role in CM we expect that budgetary decision-making
in compulsory expenditure rests on power politics rather than benevolent support to rural
areas. This is even regardless of the declared objectives of CAP:
"CAP aims at achieving an adequate level of production, at a reasonable cost to con-
sumers, while ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and safe-
guarding the future of rural areas. Given the diversity of circumstances in the EU, it
is clear that achieving these goals will not result in the same economic bene¯ts for all
Member States."20
The power politics assumption behind CAP transfers is further supported by the fact
that compulsory expenditure is based on EU legislation mainly decided by CM.21 However,
for the sake of completeness we evaluate EP's impact on the allocation of compulsory and
non-compulsory expenditure.
In EP, national dimension does not play a substantial role. Roland and Noury (2002)
provide a throughout investigation on determinants of MEPs voting behaviour. They
argue that party discipline in EP is comparable to that observed in the U.S. House
of Representatives whereas MEPs nationality has only a minor impact on their voting
behaviour. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that EP does not care the national dis-
tribution of power but try to pursue benevolent needs-based policies based of political
dimension, especially, in structural spending.
Citing the EU budget policy declarations in structural operations:
"An objective of the EU is the achievement of economic and social progress across
the Member States. By their nature, structural actions should result in di®erences in
expenditure between Member States."22
20See http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget.
21For EP's general in°uence in EU legislation see Napel and Widgr¶ en (2006).
22See http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget.
15Hence, the aim of structural spending is to redistribute EU's common resources from
rich countries and regions to poor countries and regions. If EP has substantial impact on
structural spending (non-compulsory expenditure) and if it pursues benevolent policies,
income di®erences should have impact on national non-compulsory budget receipts. To
see whether this impact exists, we apply proxy for member states' needs. The proxy
denoted by INCOME is computed as the ratio of the country's GDP per capita and the
EU wide GDP per capita.23
We expect the non-compulsory budget shares to be negatively related to ¶ and posi-
tively related to power SSI. We also expect that EP's presence favours poor countries and
disfavours rich countries.
3.5 Empirical Model
A simple test of the power politics, needs and close cooperation is be based on two
regressions, one for compulsory spending and another for non-compulsory expenditure.
Since there exist no data on member states' shares of compulsory and non-compulsory
spending we need to proxy them using CAP and other spending as noted above.







kFG + "it; (3)
where sk
it denotes country i's share of compulsory (k = C) or non-compulsory (k =
NC) expenditure at period t. On the right-hand side, SSIit denotes the power of country
i at period t as de¯ned in equation (3) above, INCOMEit denotes the needs measure
as de¯ned above, FG denotes the Franco-German axis getting the value 1 for France
and Germany and zero otherwise. The term "k
it is a mean zero stochastic error that
should capture all the short run variation of compulsory or non-compulsory expenditure
shares that cannot be explained by SSI, INCOME and FG. To this end, note that should
the voting power distribution explain the budget shares all alone, we should have the
restrictions ®k = 0, °k = 0, ±
k = 0 and ¯ = 1 we have one to one correspondence between
23We use PPP corrected real income data (see Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2004).
16Table 1: OLS Regression Results for Compulsory Budget Shares in 1976-2003
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
SSI ) 1.129 0.839 1.160 0.790





CONSTANT -0.011 0.001 -0.036 0.018
(-1.52) (0.21) (-2.39) (1.00)
R2 0.74 0.85 0.75 0.85
Note: Robust t-values are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 46 observations corresponding to
the countries in EU-9 (1976-80), EU-10 (1981-85), EU-12 (1986-94), and EU-15 (1995-2003).
power and budget receipts(see Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2004). In the following, we assess
the roles of political power, Franco-German cooperation and benevolent income-related
views as determinants of member states' gross receipts from the EU budget.
4 Results
Pooled OLS estimates of the parameters of (3) for compulsory non-compulsory)spending
are reported in tables 1 and 2, respectively. The 95% con¯dence interval of the SSI
parameter is [:93;1:33]. This interval includes 1:0, and thus, is in line with our theoretical
expectations in compulsory spending. The same holds for non-compulsory spending in
which the corresponding 95% con¯dence interval of the SSI parameter is [:88;1:48]
In addition to the pure power politics models, tables 1 and 2 present three di®erent
models for both types of expenditure having also relative real income per capita and
Franco-German cooperation as explanatory variables. The former attempts to capture
the needs view and benevolent aspects of budget allocation whereas the latter captures
well known deeper collaboration between the two core countries of European integration.24
24Note that Franco-German axis is not the only potential implicit form of deeper cooperation. The
Benelux and the Nordic countries are also often mentioned (see de Schoutheete 1990 for discussion on
17Table 2: OLS Regression Results for Non-compulsory Budget Shares in 1976-2003
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
SSI 1.185 1.524 1.094 1.394





CONSTANT -0.011 -0.031 0.057 0.013
(-1.23) (-2.16) (3.01) (0.50)
R2 0.57 0.68 0.65 0.70
Note: Robust t-values are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 46 observations corresponding to
the countries in EU-9 (1976-80), EU-10 (1981-85), EU-12 (1986-94), and EU-15 (1995-2003).
but left here out of the analysis.
The second columns of tables 1 and 2, report the models in which political power and
a priori collaboration of France and Germany explain the budget receipts. The latter
is captured by a dummy variable that takes on the value one for France and Germany
and zero otherwise. The parameter coe±cient is signi¯cant in both compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure. Note, however, that the sign of the Franco-German parameter
estimate is positive in compulsory and negative in non-compulsory expenditure. The
former is in line with the argument that the expansion of CAP during the early years of
European integration, especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, was an implicit contract
between France and Germany. Germany was in favour of developing the Single Market
since Germans emphasized the bene¯ts of deeper trade integration on their manufacturing
industry. On contrary, France feared potential losses that might arise from more open
trade policy and intensi¯ed competition within the Single Market and argued in favour of
protecting formerly sheltered sectors and agriculture, in particular. Indeed, Blankart and
Kirchner (2004) argue that the consequent inplicit Franco-German deal gave birth to CAP
and its rapid expansion: French exit would have been a disaster for the Community and
these sub-systems and Widgr¶ en 1994 for their quantitative impact on the distribution of power in the
EU council).
18their threats of leaving the EC were credible enough to obtain EC support for farmers.25
Based on this background it is not surprising to note that the internal allocation of CAP
receipts between France and Germany is strongly favourable to France.
In the third columns of tables 1 and 2, we have added the INCOME variable, which
also gets opposite signs regarding the type of expenditure. In compulsory expenditure, the
parameter estimate of the income variable is not statistically signi¯cant and, moreover,
gets an unexpected positive sign. In non-compulsory expenditure, the sign is negative, as
expected, and statistically signi¯cant at 1 percent level. The former con¯rms an earlier
observation that agricultural spending tends to be allocated towards richer member states
(e.g. Baldwin 2005), which is in contradiction with the needs view as rural areas tend
to be poorer than EU average. In non-compulsory expenditure, the estimation results
con¯rm that benevolent aspects have an impact on budget allocation when the EP has
in°uence on the determination of member states' receipts. Note here that the intercept
is statistically signi¯cant suggesting that each member state has a ¯xed share of receipts
to start bargaining with.
In the full model (column (4)), political power and Franco-German collaboration re-
main signi¯cant determinants of budget allocation whereas the income variable, whose
parameter estimate is of expected sign, is not signi¯cant. In non-compulsory expenditure,
the intercept turns insigni¯cant again while in compulsory expenditure it is not signi¯-
cant. This suggests that in the model where benevolent aspects matter (non-compulsory
expenditure) the budget shares are based on political power and a ¯xed share. Franco-
German cooperation brings a ¯xed cost for each member state and if the relative income
levels are taken into account member states get a ¯xed bene¯t. In the full model, these
e®ects o®-set each other. This suggests Franco-German collaboration yields a cost for
member states that materialises through CAP and the compensation is obtained mainly
by the poorest member states through structural spending. Note that structural spending
started to expand rapidly in the mid-1980s after Greece's and later Spain's and Portugal's
entry. These countries claimed for support for the adjustment process into a more com-
25French empty chair policy in late 1965 and early 1966 was one realisation of these threats.
19Table 3: OLS Regression Results for Total Budget Shares in 1976-2003
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
SSI (Á) 1.119 1.003 1.116 0.993
(19.17) (15.01) (18.34) (12.65)
INCOME (¶) -0.002 -0.019
(-0.22) (-2.18)
FG (FS) 0.029 0.039
(2.82) (3.86)
CONSTANT (C) -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 0.019
(-2.06) (-1.05) (-0.73) (1.45)
R2 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.90
Note: *** shows statistical signi¯cance of the regression coe±cient at 1 percent level, ** at 5 percent
level and * at 10 percent level respectively.
Note: Robust t-values are given in parentheses. The sample consists of 46 observations corresponding to
the countries in EU-9 (1976-80), EU-10 (1981-85), EU-12 (1986-94), and EU-15 (1995-2003).
petitive environment of the Internal Market. As the engines of EU integration, France
and Germany wanted to secure smooth progress of the Internal Market integration and
beyond to monetary union and eastern enlargement by supporting the adjustment of three
new-born democracies into the Internal Market via structural spending and later via co-
hesion funds. Another motive might be the willingness to avoid domestic con°icts and
the raise of radical views against EU integration in Spain, Portugal and Greece.
Using the regressions in (3) we obtain the predictions for member states total budget
shares ^ sk
i as follows
^ si = c^ s
C
i + (1 ¡ c)^ s
NC
i (4)
where c denotes the share of compulsory expenditure in EU budget and ^ s the OLS
¯t for member states' budget shares for compulsory (k=C) and non-compulsory (k=NC)
budget shares, respectively.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for total budget shares. The idea is to investigate
if the distinction between the two types of expenditure helps us to predict member states'


























































































































Figure 3: The di®erences between predictions of the full model (table 3) and power politics
model of Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2007)
21EU budget more explicitly to the analysis than in previous studies.26
Table 3 demonstrates that, indeed, the two main variables that explain member states'
receipts from EU budget are political power and Franco-German collaboration. Interest-
ingly, the income variable does not have any explanatory power if we omit Franco-German
dummy and its explanatory power turns out to be signi¯cant if we add collaboration of
France and Germany to the right-hand side of the regression.
In sum, our estimation results suggests that member states budget receipts can be
explained very well by political power and Franco-German collaboration. The latter is in
line with more qualitative analysis of the development of the EU budget (see e.g. Blankart
and Kirchner (2004)). Benevolent aspects have impact on non-compulsory expenditure
but political power has a clear dominance as a determinant. The results also demonstrate
that benevolent aspects have gained importance via structural spending. This suggests
that they might gain even more importance in the future when the division line between
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure is vanishing and the role of the EP in bud-
getary process is likely to be strengthened.
The predictions in table 3 allows us to assess the impact of benevolent objectives to
budget allocation. Figure 3 shows country by country di®erences between the predictions
using the model shown in column (1)27 and column (4) of table 3. The ¯gure clearly
demonstrates that the cohesion countries get higher predictions in the latter model. Using
the predicted budget shares the estimate for the impact of benevolent objectives in budget
allocation is still only 7 per cent computed as the absolute di®erence between the two
predictions.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we split the EU budget spending to compulsory and non-compulsory part.
Doing so we were able to evaluate the potential role of the European Parliament or
benevolent objectives in determination of member states' budget receipts. We assumed
that the Parliament's goal is to pursue benevolent goals whereas the Council's objectives
26See, however, Kauppi and Widgr¶ en (2004).
27See Kauppi and Widgr¶ en 2007 for details
22are based on national interests and bargaining between member states. More detailed
description of the EU budget allocation shows that benevolent objectives have a role in
the determination of EU budget allocation via structural spending and that spreads to
budget allocation in general. As, however, national interests have a major role in both
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure the overall impact of benevolent objectives
remains moderate.
This paper concentrates on pre-enlargement budget. It is likely that the EU budget
allocation will face revisions in the future. The recent trend in two decades has been a
shift from CAP to structural spending. This paper suggests that this tendency together
with the recent enlargements might open an avenue for increasing power of the European
Parliament in budget allocation. This paper suggests that it is still quite small.
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